



What does decarbonisation mean for the energy relationship between 
the EU and Russia? With the EU’s objective to reduce its emissions of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) by 80-95% by 2050 comes the requirement 
to shift away from dependence on fossil fuels. The EU and Russia have 
long been coupled through interdependent energy needs – the EU needs 
to import a high proportion of fossil fuels to meet its energy demand, 
and Russia needs to export its fossil fuels for economic stability. As 
the EU shifts towards alternative sources of energy and heightened 
energy efficiency, it is worth reflecting on the implications of such a 
shift for this important energy relationship. How does or could the EU’s 
objective to transition to a low-carbon economy change the narratives 
around energy security on both sides of the relationship? 
This policy brief explores the interests and narratives of both the EU and 
Russia on how their energy relations will evolve under decarbonisation. 
I describe the Russian strategy to promote natural gas in particular, 
to negotiate on a bilateral basis with member states and to propose 
new gas pipelines and routes in direct response to the EU’s stated aim 
to improve security of supply through diversification. I also discuss 
the EU’s response to Russian tactics. This includes a brief overview 
of the institutionalised actions the EU can take through a renewal 
of the Energy Dialogues and the implementation of the Third Energy 
Package, the reality of a divided EU in the face of Russia, and the 
rhetoric on decarbonisation internally not matching policy action. 
Finally, I conclude by highlighting potential opportunities to break 
free from the Russian narrative that promotes sticking to the status 
quo – opportunities that require political leadership from the EU on 
decarbonisation, but also mean linking to regional and local levels in 
Russia to overcome political barriers for further economic integration 
in the context of decarbonisation.
The context of decarbonisation challenges the perception of threats 
and opportunities on both sides of the energy relationship, and 
narratives that link to the long-term goal of transition can more 
prominently underline positive interlinkages and opportunities than 
short-term concerns. In particular, there is considerable potential 
for the EU to continue to engage with Russia in energy trade based 
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on renewable sources of energy, if only a long-term transition 
narrative could become embedded within the relations. This 
is a case of competing narratives in the present drowning out 
potential win-win scenarios for both the EU and Russia into the 
future. 
Background: EU-Russian energy relations and 
decarbonisation
Energy relations between the EU and Russia have long been based 
on (relatively stable) trade in fossil fuels. In 2014, the EU was 
53% dependent on imports of fossil fuels to meet its energy 
needs (Eurostat, 2016), and Russian oil and gas, in particular, 
comprised a great share of such imports. The remarkable stability 
in security of supply and demand between the EU and Russia 
has been questioned since the mid-2000s, with a number of gas 
The EU agreed in 2009 to reduce its greenhouse 
gas emissions by 80-95% by 2050, compared to 
1990 levels. This ‘decarbonisation’ objective means 
a massive shift away from fossil fuel consumption. 
Currently, EU-Russian energy relations are based on 
interdependence of fossil fuel import and export. 
As the EU promotes its climate and decarbonisation 
objectives, Russia has countered with tactics 
supporting a narrative in favour of the status quo. So 
far, the EU’s response to Russian narratives has been 
uncoordinated, but there is considerable potential 
for the conflicting narratives of decarbonisation and 
status quo fossil fuel consumption to move to an 
emphasis on ‘opportunities’. In such a narrative, both 
the EU and Russia would benefit from the innovative 
and modernising effects of a serious engagement with 
decarbonisation, including continued relations based 
on renewable energy trade.
supply crises in the EU due to Russia’s conflicts with Ukraine, and 
the more recent annexation of Crimea that has led to a cooling 
of relations (Bosse and Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011; Le Coq and 
Paltseva, 2012). Energy has been used as a foreign policy tool 
by Russia, and its interactions with the EU follow a similar logic. 
Where the EU is dependent on Russian energy, some suggest it 
is held hostage and has little room for manoeuvre to respond 
to broader Russian belligerence in its neighbourhood. A counter 
argument suggests that Russia is just as dependent on the EU as 
the EU is on Russia, leading to complex political games where 
neither side wishes to upset the other (Harsem and Harald Claes, 
2013). As such, EU-Russian energy relations are embedded in a 
broader (geopolitical) understanding of foreign relations. 
Added to this complex energy-foreign policy arrangement is 
the EU’s objective to decarbonise its economy by 2050 (Dupont 
and Oberthür, 2015). This objective will mean a huge decline 
in demand for fossil fuel imports, severely impacting Russian 
economic interests. In 2013, oil and natural gas exports accounted 
for 68% of total export revenues for Russia.2  In 2014, Russia 
saw a year-on-year decline in total pipeline exports of natural 
gas of 11.8% (BP, 2015). Compounding the political context 
of sanctions in the wake of the annexation of Crimea, the EU’s 
climate policy objectives are perceived as a further threat to 
the economic interests of Russia that relies to a great extent on 
fossil fuel exports (Casier, 2015; Khrushcheva and Maltby, 2015). 
Furthermore, in the context of low global oil prices, Russia is keen 
to keep its fossil fuel markets intact, and the EU is under pressure 
to demonstrate real commitment to the planned transition away 
from dependence on cheap fossil fuels. 
Given the shift away from fossil fuels required to achieve 
decarbonisation, the EU’s objective and its broader climate 
policy goals are perceived as in conflict with Russian economic 
interests. Russia’s interests in the energy relationship with the 
EU are currently linked to ensuring continued fossil fuel trade. In 
other words, Russia argues in favour of propping up the status 
quo of EU dependence on imports, while cloaking this within the 
language of natural gas as a secure and ‘clean’ fossil fuel.
The Russian response – narratives to support the status 
quo
There are three main ways Russia has reacted to the possibility 
of transition in the EU’s economy: lobbying the EU in favour of 
natural gas, negotiating with EU member states bilaterally, and 
proposing new business opportunities through further pipeline 
connections between the EU and Russia. Each of these tactics 
aims to support the narrative of keeping the status quo for the 
benefit of security of supply and demand for both sides. Climate 
change does not feature highly in Russian politics (Khrushcheva 
and Maltby, 2015), so there is little room for change in narrative 
internally within Russia in favour of a transition away from fossil 
fuels. 
First, lobbying efforts focus on keeping natural gas as a key 
element of a more ‘climate-friendly’ energy system. Natural gas 
is touted as a flexible complement to any power system moving 
to variable renewable energy sources, or as a ‘bridging fuel’ to a 
more sustainable energy system. Russia supports a disinformation 
campaign around the ‘cleanliness’ of natural gas. While it may be 
less climate damaging than coal, for example, it is still a fossil fuel 
with high emissions of GHGs. At the EU level, Russian lobbying 
works through the state-led Gazprom energy company. Officially, 
Gazprom employs ten people, with four full-time equivalents, 
to lobby the EU institutions on issues surrounding the Energy 
Union, EU energy security, GHG emissions and environmental 
policies, resource efficiency, and the impact of TTIP on the 
European energy market.3  In addition, Gazprom outsources 
further activities to the consulting company G Plus Ltd, which 
employs 35 people.4  Between January 2015 and March 2016, 
most official meetings between the European Commission and 
Gazprom focused on discussions around the Energy Union. 
In 2016, Gazprom met specifically with climate and energy 
Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete to discuss the gas market and 
gas infrastructure projects.5 Research on the type of lobbying 
activities carried out by Gazprom highlights the perception from 
the EU institutions of the use of ‘aggressive’ tactics that are 
not necessarily intended to inform but rather to disinform or 
to pressurise. For example, certain interviewees in a study by 
Tsvetanov (2015) indicated that Gazprom’s communication 
tactics were intrusive and that their lobbying efforts often 
included lavish gifts or events, leading to the impression that 
they were willing to go farther in their efforts to get what they 
wanted. These type of activities were seen in contrast to other 
energy lobby groups that stick more closely to the EU rules on 
transparency in lobbying activities (Tsvetanov, 2015).
Second, Russia also engages in a game of ‘divide and rule’ (de 
Jong, 2016). When it comes to supporting natural gas over 
renewable energy and energy efficiency, Russia does not need to 
spend too much time lobbying the EU-level when it can negotiate 
contracts for sales of gas and new pipeline projects directly with 
member states. Russia has a strong history of bypassing the EU-
level to meet country’s immediate energy needs and thereby 
weakening EU solidarity and unity. The EU’s Energy Union was 
initially proposed (by then Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk) 
to avoid such scenarios and ensure heightened EU-solidarity in 
external energy negotiations – particularly by negotiating as 
a bloc for supplies of fossil fuels (Szulecki et al., 2016). The 
idea has since become embedded in EU energy policy, but has 
broadened considerably from the energy security dimension to 
encompass also energy efficiency, research and innovation, the 
internal market, and decarbonisation (European Commission, 
2015). The solidarity mechanism proposed by Tusk has evolved 
into a repackaging of EU energy and climate policy, but energy 
security issues de facto remain largely in the hands of member 
states. Russia has capitalised on this diffusion of competence 
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on energy issues and negotiated bilaterally with several member 
states to the detriment of EU unity and the overarching EU 
decarbonisation vision. The longer the EU’s member states 
negotiate their own supplies of fossil fuels outside of a solidarity 
mechanism among all 28 – as Russia wishes – the harder it will 
be to more away from fossil fuels and to achieve decarbonisation 
(Pfeiffer et al., 2016). 
Third, Russia acts to support new natural gas pipeline projects 
that could by-pass Ukraine. Russia has long blamed any gas 
instability in the EU on problems with Ukraine as a main transit 
country. Business opportunities for new pipelines are negotiated 
bilaterally with particular EU member states (such as with 
Germany in the case of the Nord Stream pipeline), with states in 
the EU’s neighbourhood (such as Turkey) or are unilateral projects 
that then require follow-up with affected states for buy-in (as 
was the case with the now-cancelled South Stream pipeline 
project). Infrastructure projects provide long-term reassurance 
to Russia that their interests to continue selling natural gas 
to Europe are more likely to be fulfilled, in the face of climate 
change objectives. Such pipelines typically have a lifetime of 
50 years or more, and given the investment costs, stakeholders’ 
interests preclude the full operation of the infrastructure for 
secure returns. New projects are developing even in the face of 
already-dwindling European demand for gas (BP, 2015) and long-
term EU climate objectives that exclude all but a tiny portion of 
fossil energy. Such long-term security strategies heighten the 
incoherence between EU-level climate policy and member state 
interactions with Russia on energy security (Dupont, 2016).
The EU response – still developing
So far, the EU response to Russian narratives in support of the 
status quo has been uncoordinated and diffuse, resulting in a 
strengthening of the Russian story. This is particularly evident in 
the weakening of EU unity on internal energy and climate policy 
(Skovgaard, 2014). The Visegrad group of countries have become 
less interested in ambitious climate policy (Dupont and Oberthür, 
2016) and EU internal policy discussions reflect the lack of unity. 
But potential exists to counteract Russian narratives, particularly 
by drawing on existing institutional tools and supporting policy 
rhetoric with policy action on energy efficiency and renewable 
energy. 
First, there are institutional tools available that can be used 
to counter the Russian fossil narrative with one highlighting 
modernisation in a climate-friendly manner. These include the 
implementation of EU internal energy market rules and the 
(now suspended) EU-Russia Energy Dialogue. When it comes 
to the EU’s internal energy market, the European Commission 
has been invited to participate in country-level negotiations to 
ensure that EU unity on energy policy is upheld. Both Poland 
and Lithuania have invited Commission officials to participate 
in their negotiations with Russia (Pakalkaite and Thaler, 2016) 
– one effective way to counteract Russian tactics to ‘divide and 
rule’. This has allowed these member states more leverage in the 
negotiations by relying on the EU ‘rules’ to bind the room for 
manoeuvre. Furthermore, the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue once 
proved a fruitful discussion area for the promotion of renewable 
energy and energy efficiency in Russia, but this forum has been 
suspended as a result of the Ukraine crisis (Khrushcheva and 
Maltby, 2016). It showed particular potential to link to regional 
and local governance levels within Russia, where a willingness 
to engage with clean energy alternatives and energy efficiency 
strategies seemed more pronounced than at the Russian national 
level (ibid.).
Second, the EU can counter Russian narratives by getting serious 
about its decarbonisation objective. Climate and energy policy 
are intertwined – the more climate-friendly our energy system 
becomes, the less there is a need for fossil fuel imports and 
the more the EU is ‘free’ from Russian influence (Casier, 2015; 
Khrushcheva and Maltby, 2015). Energy efficiency, in particular, 
is identified as a far better energy security strategy than seeking 
out new supplies of fossil fuels. It is a strategy that not only 
ensures better security, but also reduces costs and emissions (van 
Renssen, 2014). The EU needs to heighten coherence between its 
long-term decarbonisation objective and short or medium-term 
energy policies. Where decarbonisation is seriously pursued, no 
more fossil infrastructure will be contemplated (Dupont, 2016).
Way forward?
For both Russia and the EU, there needs to be a change in narrative 
for productive and modernising transformation. The Russian 
narrative in support of continued fossil fuel use is old-fashioned. 
International support for climate action was clearly present 
during the climate negotiations in Paris in 2015, culminating in 
the Paris Agreement (Dröge et al., 2016). Russia must consider 
its role in a world where its near neighbours will be transitioning 
away from fossil fuels. The EU needs to consider its own policy 
objectives in harmony with its external energy relations. Short-
term concerns cannot trump long-term objectives when they 
result in conflicting outcomes and come with the risk of ‘lock-
in’ to a fossil system. The decarbonisation rhetoric needs to be 
backed up with stronger policy instruments.
For both the EU and Russia, the current conflicting narratives on 
decarbonisation and continued fossil fuel use lead to a patchwork 
of status quo projects developed at multiple levels of governance. 
For both sides, the status quo cannot continue. Carbon-based 
energy systems will soon be out-dated, and innovative countries 
and regions will reap the benefits of the transition to a sustainable 
society (Siddi, 2016). What both sides need to emphasise is the 
opportunity that comes with decarbonisation. Decarbonisation 
means changing the type of energy consumed, but energy will
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still be required. By updating energy systems to allow for trade in 
renewable energy rather than fossil fuels, the EU-Russian energy 
relation can be climate-proofed, particularly considering the 
great untapped potential in Russia for renewable energy resources 
(Casier, 2015; Khrushcheva and Maltby, 2015). Where EU-Russia 
energy relations have been based on out-dated understandings 
of fossil-based energy systems, decarbonisation need not 
represent a threat to Russia economic interests or EU political 
interests, but rather form the basis of a new relationship towards 
the modernisation of both systems. A new ‘decarbonisation 
opportunity narrative’ is required.
Footnotes
1 I would like to thank Tomas Maltby, Olga Khrushcheva, Mikhail Krutikhin, Andrei 
Belyi and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and feedback.
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2016. 
3  See: http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.
do?id=622135013267-04, accessed 25 May 2016. 
4 See: http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.
do?id=7223777790-86, accessed 25 May 2016.
5  See: http://www.integritywatch.eu/, accessed 25 May 2016.
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